Ontology of Ibn Al-'Arabī and Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī in the Interpretation of Crimean Thinker Aḥmad bin 'Abd Allah al-Qrimi

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Abstract

The study is dedicated to the work of Crimean scholar Aḥmad bin 'Abd Allah al-Qrimi, who was one of the most advanced interpreters of the Ibn Al-'Arabī's and Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī's Sufi philosophy. Aḥmad al-Qrimi employed Ibn Sina's views on division of essence and existence, as well as some concepts of Māturīdī theology. His manuscript work "Advise for the Perplexed and Key for the Exigent" shows main dimensions of Aḥmad al-Qrimi's thought as following: 1) The notion of Being in the works of Ibn Al-'Arabī and Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī is interpreted as the idea of necessary existence, as suggested by ibn Sina; 2) the conception of the identity of the absolute and necessary being is understood as the only right approach for the solution of polemics between adepts and critics of Sufism; 3) conception of "correlation" is considered as solution for the problem of relations between mind and reality.

The biography of Aḥmad bin 'Abd Allah al-Qrimi (d. 1457), as incidentally the other Crimean authors of the Golden Horde period, is known rather superficially. According to Sulaymān al-Kafawī, Aḥmad al-Qrimi studied under guidance of Ḥāfiḍh ad-Dīn al-Bazzāzī (1402–1404) and Sharaf ad-Dīn al-Qrimi (d. 1440) (Al-Kafawī, Kata'ib: p. 350b). The thinker was most likely born in the Crimean Peninsula. All the sources mentioned him exclusively under the name "Crimean" (Al-Krimi, Al-Qrimi, Al-Quraimi, etc.). Around 1436, as Mehmet Bursali notes, Aḥmad al-Qrimi left his homeland (probably due to difficult political circumstances) and arrived in Merzifon in northern Asia Minor (Bursali, 1975: p. 368). At that time, the Ottoman Empire was growing rapidly as a central political power in the Sunni part of the Muslim world, and many scholars from neighbouring regions migrated there. This migration, according to Ertugrul Yukten, increased especially during the reign of

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Sultan Murad II (1421–1444, 1446–1451) (Ökten, 2013: p. 61–70). Aḫmad al-Qrimi was personally acquainted with Murad II, and got a significant support in his career (TashkopriZade, 1975: p. 50–51). Gudrun Schubert estimates that Aḫmad al-Qrimi was the author of at least eight significant works. Some of them have survived to this day only in a form of manuscript and, despite their importance, have never been published (Schubert, 1994: p. 1367). Almost all but one of Aḫmad al-Qrimi's papers belong to the typical postclassical genre of commentary (sharaḫ) and gloss (ḫashiyah). This is, in particular, the ḫashiyah on the commentary of at-Taftazānī to ‘‘aqīdah (teaching principles) by an-Nasafī (AK, a). Given the author's special attention to issues of logic and dialectics, we can assume that this ḫashiyah was written as a kind of guide for the students of Aḫmad al-Qrimi himself. Another work, a ḫashiyah on al-Taftazānī's commentary on the work ‘Ubayd Allah al-Maḫbūbī Al-Bukhārī (d. 1346), by al-Talwīḫ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Explanation of the Fundamentals of Law), reveals mainly hermeneutical issues (AK, ps). Aḫmad al-Qrimi also refers to the legacy of famous thinkers of the past, in particular, Abū Ḥamid Al-Ghazālī, who also had quite popular legal researches (for example, Al-Mustashfa, "A Pure Exposition of the Science of the Fundamentals of Law") (Al-Ghazālī , 1993). Aḫmad al-Qrimi was also the author of a ḫashiyah on the commentary of Jamāl ad-Dīn Nukrakār (d. 1374) to the philological work of Lubb al-Albāb ("Nucleus of Nuclei") by Muhammad al-Isfarayini (d. 1285). He also commented (in the genre of sharaḫ) on the work of Gulshan-e Rāz ("Flower Garden of Secrets") of the Persian Sufi Maḫmūd Shabistari (1288-1340), and this fact allows us to note his acquaintance with the Persian language. The text of this work has not survived. Also mentioned is Shah Aḫmad al-Qrimi to the work of the disciple of the "great Shaykh" Ibn Al-‘Arabī’ (1165-1240) Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī (1207-1274) Miftāḫ al-Ghayb ("The Key to the Secret"). At least three copies of this commentary have been preserved (Ergin, 1957: pp. 71–72). Another surviving work of Aḫmad al-Qrimi, which, compared to the above-mentioned ones, is even more original - "Correction light in the revelation of the ‘Lights of Exile’", a gloss to one of the most famous interpretations of the *Qur’ān*, written by ‘Abd Allah al-Baydāwī (d. 1286/1320). Aḫmad al-Qrimi, according to a manuscript from the Sulaymāniyyah Library, wrote this work in the 1950s [AK, d]. This allows

us to consider Correction light in the revelation of the Lights of Exile" as one of the first glosses to al- Baydāwī's commentary. In total, according to one of the most authoritative catalogues, at least 333 glosses have been written on al- Baydāwī's commentary, among which Aḫmad al-Qrimi's work is ranked seventh. Aḫmad al-Qrimi was one of the first popularisers of al- Baydāwī 's exegetical heritage in the Ottoman Empire, as, according to the same catalogue, the previous six authors were of Persian origin and worked mainly in modern Iran (Figrist, 1987: p. 321–322).

Of particular interest is the work of Aḫmad al-Qrimi "Nasih al-Ghaimin wa Fatiha al-Khatimin", which deals exclusively with the ontology of Sufism. The only known manuscript of this work is preserved in the library of the University of Basel (Switzerland) and contains 222 sheets of handwriting text [AK, e]. According to the scribe's note at the end of the manuscript, the text was transcribed in Constantinople in 1530. Thus, we have a copy, probably from the original of Aḫmad al-Qrimi himself. The work, in addition to three parts, has a detailed preface and introduction, which made possible to determine its general purpose. First of all, Aḫmad al-Qrimi tried to explain to "worthy scholars" the words "two divine Shaykhs", namely Ibn Al-'Arabī' (1165-1240) and Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī (d. 1274). The first part, entitled "The assertion that the Almighty is absolute being," substantiates the fundamental ontology of the doctrine of waḫdat wujūd ("unity of being"), which emerged in the writings of Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī. The second part (conditionally "epistemological"), "Explanation of levels of thought and speculative evidence", proves the possibility of knowing the unity of being through its inalienable properties. By "properties" Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī meant divine names manifested in the phenomena of the visible world ('ālam ash-shahādah) (Beneito, 1998: p. 80). Aḫmad al-Qrimi considered the Maghrib writer and commentator on Sufi texts, Shigab ad-Din Abu Hajjal (1325–1375) and the Central Asian theologian 'Alā' ad-Dīn al-Bukhārī (1377–1437), to be his main opponents in these matters. The latter, in particular, includes a critical work Fadihat al-Mulhiddin and Nasihat al-Muwahiddin ("Dishonesty of Heretics and Guidelines for Monotheists"), directed against Fuṣūṣ al- Ḥikam (Ibn Al-'Arabī''s "Gemma of Wisdom").

Unlike his opponents, who directly accused Ibn Al-‘Arabī’ of "disbelief" (Kufr), Aḫmad al-Qrimi is quite balanced and moderate in his treatment of both parties. According to him, the true teachings of the divine sheikhs (already mentioned by Ibn Al-‘Arabī, Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī, Jalal ad-Din al-Rumi, as well as ibn al-Farid (1181-1235) and Mu'id ad-Din al-Jundi (d. 1290)) differs from how it is represented by opponents, because it needs to be considered "in accordance with the proper logical law" (AK, e: p. 2a-6a). Therefore, understanding the works of Ibn Al-‘Arabī’ and Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī from the standpoint of "reason and sharī‘at" will "overcome all doubts" [AK, e: p. 7a]. The introduction (muqaddimah) begins with a categorical analysis of the concepts: "Justification of the nature of existence, explanation of its self, justification of the meaning of some words used by revered divine Shaykhs, may the Lord be pleased with all of them" [AK, e: p. 7a]. Aḫmad al-Qrimi reveals two meanings of the concept of wujūd ("being"): "It is used as polysemic in two senses. The first meaning is something different from non-being and its opposite. So, this is the reality on which everything that is next to it is based, and it is called real being. The second meaning is a verb noun that indicates "comprehension" and "manifestation" [AK, e: ark. 7a]. As we know, the verb ‘wajada’, from which this concept originates, means "to find" or "to be", therefore, it can be interpreted in these two meanings. The first sense of this concept, for example, was used by Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī (800-863 / 870) (Al-Kindi, 1953: p. 81–163). Aḫmad al-Qrimi, emphasising that wujūd as such is inherent, combines both meanings: everything around us is inherent in, so it allows us to talk about the wujūd of these things. Aḫmad al-Qrimi also calls this kind of wujūd (which is accessible from the outside) "relative" (iḍāfī) because it is defined by the observer (AK, e: ark. 7b).

Next, Aḫmad al-Qrimi described a typical peripatetic concept of existence, proposed by Ibn Sina.

Being as such is not conditioned by anything and is not limited by anything, is not general and not partial, not generalised and not singled out, nor is it unique in terms of unity added to its essence, nor is it plural. On the contrary, it is from all these things that its existence, its various levels and degrees, logically follow.

Writes Aḫmad al-Qrimi (AK, e: p. 7b).

Thus, those characteristics of being that are recorded by the observer, mean that being is "no more and no less" (as Parmenides of Elea once claimed), but is logically (namely logically, not ontologically) conditioned by them. Aḫmad al-Qrimi's apophatic statements are aimed primarily at verifying (athbāt, literally "assertion") absolute existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq, literally "unlimited existence"), which is not limited by the borders of individual things. This justification is based on the fundamental ontology of Ibn Sina, which distinguishes between the very nature of things (magic) and being due to the fact that the existence of things does not follow ontologically from its definition, which, in fact, determines the essence (Ibn Sina, 1968: p. 10– 25). It is worth noting that in Aḫmad al-Qrimi, based on Ibn Al-'Arabī' and Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī, "limited" (ie, objective being) is primarily existing (thing - shay), ontic, and the absolute being - ontological. Aḫmad al-Qrimi tries to define the concept of wujūd without proposing a clear definition, but rather referring to the context of word's usage: "being is the most general of all things, if you look at it in terms of generalization and the ability to embrace all beings" (AK, e: f. 8a). Wujūd is the one and indivisible; it defines the existence of absolutely everything: "Nothing happens in the mind or in external existence, except through being, because it is this being that comprehends everything by itself, having neither opposites nor similarities, that is, there are no two separate opposites and similarities, really different from each other or equal to each other "(AK, e: p. 8a). Thus, Aḫmad al-Qrimi emphasizes the uniqueness of being as such, which cannot be contrasted with either abstract "otherness" or "non-being" (conceived in the Islamic tradition as ʿadam, i.e. 'absence').

Self-existent being is established in its own self through its very self, it affirms everything around it, has no beginning or end, and is not replaced by nothingness. It is primordial, eternal, has a single reality and is not subject to plurality, because it is the basis of unity as such. (AK, e: p. 8b)

Being, according to Aḫmad al-Qrimi, is also characterized by certain "levels" (marātib), by which, probably, the author meant the universal "absolute being" and objective "relative being" (AK, e: ark. 8b). According to Chittick, the question of the gradation of existence was not

discussed at all in Ibn Al-‘Arabī’s school, although some of the early opponents of Sadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī himself (in particular, Ibn Sina’s commentator Nasīr ad-Dīn al-Ṭūsī) emphasized the need for such a division, comparing being with light, the brightness of which depends on the strength of the source (Chittick, 1981: p. 87–104). It can be concluded that Aḥmad al-Qrimi tries to substantiate the idea of being itself as such, not limited by the subject and determining for the objects themselves as things. "Absolute being" in Aḥmad al-Krim has the same characteristics as "being with necessity" (wājib al-wujūd) in Ibn Sina (Ibn Sina, 1968: p. 10–25).

In the first part of his work, Aḥmad al-Qrimi substantiates the ontological-pantheistic idea of the unity of being and God. The evidence he refers to is based on Aristotle's traditional philosophical logic: "Logical syllogisms confirm that if the Almighty were not an absolute being, he would be either non-being or pure absence, or being dependent on something else, or relative being" (AK , e: arc. 9a). Aḥmad al-Qrimi considers each of the four options unacceptable, because in this case the divine being can be considered exclusively as dependent on the existence of the other. Based on this, "absolute being" must coincide with being "with necessity", which Aḥmad al-Qrimi also tries to prove with the tools of formal logic. First of all, he emphasises that the idea of absolute being becomes possible due to forms, because "forms are traces of meanings and essences that exert a certain influence, even when it comes to the relationship of specific names." These "forms" (literally "images", "ideas") are influenced by a certain "reality" (ḥaqīqah), "as a result of which there are traces attached to the respective entities" (AK, e: ark. 9a). Aḥmad al-Qrimi explains the relationship between visible forms and reality (i.e., absolute being) by a very simple example: "Scholars judge a person's temperament and his defects by their moral qualities." "Moral qualities" are forms, and "temperament" is reality, i.e., the actual existence of things, which, in the end, is called absolute: "In order to achieve this reality, which affects existing individual things, we must realize that this reality must be all-encompassing, and such can only be the reality of absolute being ” (AK, e: ark. 10a). Aḥmad al-Qrimi immediately explains the relationship between the self of this reality and its very being: "being is a being (magic), and the being of a being is its self (‘ayn)." Using the

possibilities of the categorical apparatus of the Arab philosophical ontology, Aḥmad al-Qrimi argues that the existence of this self is "obligatory": essence, and absolute being - is existing with obligation, through its essence and vice versa. Thus, the "self" of absolute being is identical with its "reality". "Self" ('ʻayn, "everything that exists due to its essence") is the assertion of being as such, and its "essence" is an essence with inherent properties, which is revealed in the concept of "absolute being". From the "self" of being as such, which is self-established, follows the "obligation" of absolute being. Thus, the author concludes, "obligatory being is absolute being" (AK, e: ark. 10a).

At the end of this first part of his work, Aḥmad al-Qrimi makes three additional arguments in favour of the fact that absolute being is identical with "obligatory being". The first is based on a typical Avicenna gradation of being, which is based on the division into "obligatory" and "possible": "Being is neither a substance nor an accident, and everything that is possible can be either a substance or an accident. Being is not something possible, so absolute being is obligatory" (AK, e: ark. 10a). The impossibility of understanding being as a substance is explained by the fact that the substance is able to accept accidents, and the presence of such implies, for example, another substance, which, based on the exclusivity of being, is impossible. The following argument is also quite clear:

There is no reality in being that would be a predicate in relation to himself. It cannot, like the rest of existing things, acquire reality through some other being, for it would last indefinitely. All this kind of being is obligatory, and this is absolute being. (AK, e: ark. 11a)

The logic of proof here is simple: since it is through absolute being that things happen, becoming real, absolute being as such is real in itself, so there is no other reality as a "predicate" that would allow the absolute being itself to happen. An even more visible the third argument in favour of the identity of absolute and "obligatory being" is that "everything is opposed to non-being, and nothing can be opposed to absolute being." Therefore, this being is obligatory in its essence" (AK, e: ark. 11a). This statement is formulated very specifically, because the Arabic concept of 'adam primarily means 'absence', which, in turn, is inherent in the state of possibility (imkān). The idea of a "greater" or "lesser" absence, as

evidenced by the elementary law of the excluded third, would be absurd. Therefore, since absolute being cannot be replaced by "absolute absence," it belongs to the category of the obligatory. Aḫmad al-Qrimi summarises the first part of his work in the words of Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī (who appear in the Mafātīḫ al-Ghayb and other works (see Yasin, 2003: pp. 105–109)) about the conventionality of the concept of “being”: “Our word wujūd is used only for a better understanding, not to express true reality.”

By "better understanding" there is a meaning of this word that best summarises the statements about all existing things, and does not reproduce in our minds a certain idea of the essence and essence of being" (AK, e: ark. 11b). Thus, absolute being is beyond any imagination. The second section of the paper is devoted to the explanation of how it is possible to comprehend the manifestations of this absolute being. First of all, Aḫmad al-Qrimi focused on two methods of cognition of reality, which he considers quite adequate. The first is the "path of common sense", which is primarily based on formal logic, the second - "direct experience" (literally "taste"), i.e., gnosis. It is traditional for Aḫmad al-Qrimi to appeal to ibn Sina:

Ibn Sina, the leader of the philosophers, identified the possibilities of thought in knowing what is beyond speculative power, emphasising common sense or the experience of direct justification. He has repeatedly pointed out that man is unable to comprehend the true essence of things, so the goal of man should be to know the components of things and their random features. (AK, e: p. 11b)

Note, however, that Aḫmad al-Qrimi, before describing the very path of knowledge of absolute existence, turns to epistemology. In general, his theory of knowledge corresponds to the views of Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī, expressed in the interpretation of the surah al-fātiḫah (Al- Qūnawī, 2005: p. 2–85), but Aḫmad al-Qrimi's thesis is distinguished by the more frequent use of Ibn Sina's terminology.

Aḫmad al-Qrimi is quite consistent in his views. First of all, he emphasizes the "subjectivity" of theoretical knowledge, noting that "the use of speculative constraints serves to liberate from doubt and deceptive contradictions, although speculative rules differ due to differences between the perceptions of their authors" (AK, e: p. 11b). Logical

cognition, despite the apparent neutrality of the subject, depends on irrational factors, namely "the aspirations associated with beliefs, character traits and other properties of souls" (AK, e: ark. 12b). However, Aḥmad al-Qrimi does not question the fundamental importance of logical cognition, because irrational factors are directly dependent on "individual manifestations of divine names" (AK, e: p. 12b). Since God ("Truth", Arabic: Al-Ḥaqq), according to Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī, is identical with absolute being, the properties of this being ("divine names") manifest themselves in reality. But the "readiness" of people to perceive these manifestations is different, so,

There are differences between the demands of their minds, the demands of their opinions and the judgments of their views ... what is right for one, wrong for another, what is a statement for one, for another is in doubt. (AK, e: p. 12b)

Aḥmad al-Qrimi concludes: "confidence and a sense of self-righteousness - is nothing more than the fruit of thoughts that are quite possibly wrong" (AK, e: p. 12b). With these considerations, Aḥmad al-Qrimi seeks to convince the reader that the seemingly "logical" assessments of Ibn Al-'Arabī's legacy in the writings of opponents of mysticism may be erroneous. He puts it bluntly, "We could observe how some cases, although duly substantiated, were not perceived by people as convincing, because not everyone perceived the appropriate basis for these judgments." Thus, the problem with the critics of Ibn Al-'Arabī's philosophical mysticism is that they do not know the "foundations" (muqaddīmāt) from which certain judgments follow.

Aḥmad al-Qrimi also develops other ideas of Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī, in particular, the idea of "difference" (mughā'ir) and "correlation" (munāsib) between subject and object: "difference allows to realise the absence, which motivates to search, and the correlation allows you to feel the object of "search". This judgment should also be understood in an ontological context: "difference" refers primarily to the distance from the object as such. "Correlation", which means commonality with one or more properties of the object of knowledge, is a kind of foreknowledge. Aḥmad al-Qrimi uses these two concepts as the semantic limits of the process of cognition, which does not imply either absolute identity or absolute

difference. These "extremes", in the end, do not seem possible, because only absolute being can be identical to itself, instead of "absolute difference" - is only the difference between being and non-being. Aḥmad al-Qrimi explains:

Therefore, in seeking knowledge, they use what is related to the desired thing, and not something different from it. Therefore, if the search was unattainable from all sides, it would disappear, and if it was unknown at all, it could not become wanted. In the same way, if correlation from all sides became possible, there would be no need to strive for what is sought, because in that case the seeker would look for himself. (AK, e: ark. 13b)

The process of cognition, according to Aḥmad al-Qrimi, is the realisation of the paradigm "primordial-derivative" (asl - fara', literally "root" - "branch"), typical of Arabic religious and philosophical thought (See: Smirnov, 2001). "Understanding some of the inherent properties or random features is an urgent need created by correlation, encouraging knowledge of the reality that emerges as the primary basis available to the senses," said Aḥmad al-Qrimi. "Primordial", i.e., reality (ḥaqīqah), is revealed after the comprehension of "derivative" properties - manifestations (tajalliyyāt) of the divine. Under such conditions, cognition will acquire the character of "ascent" (‘urūj), in which properties as manifestations of the divine in the world of individual objects will be perceived as "traces" (’athār) of the reality of absolute being. In further theses, Aḥmad al-Qrimi questions the possibility of rational knowledge of such a reality:

Further logical judgments and foundations should be formulated in accordance with the direction of thought that can lead to such knowledge. In the end, you can achieve this reality by knowing all the levels of its properties and their components. But this is not always possible, because the seeker may either lack the mental strength and, consequently, the ability to learn, or there may be some other obstacles. (AK, e: p. 14a)

"Seekers" expand the list of properties understood by their knowledge, but it does not always bring them closer to the true essence of the thing. Even hypothetical assessments of reality will differ: "The opinions of different observers about the same thing differ due to the differences between the inherent properties and the random features to

which their feelings are directed." Thus, rational cognition allows us to verify the correlation with certain properties, but does not lead to cognition of reality.

The main task of the "seeker", according to Aḥmad al-Qrimi, should be "correlation", which is realised in the unity of all being, bringing man closer to the knowledge of the absolute being. Based on the thesis of omnipresence, the "seeker" should not overestimate each of the properties, realising that the properties are hidden essence of the divine. It is necessary to combine the will to the divine, rational perception of properties and inner strength of man. At this level, according to Aḥmad al-Qrimi, the path to the unity of "internal" and "external" (i.e., spiritual state and practical activity) is opened, which also reflects the semantic relationship typical of Arab religious and philosophical thought. To this end, the "soul" (volitional and cognitive principle) must renounce all "ordinary or ideological individuations, the advantages of certain traditions, relative attachments and all other differences, feeling the unity of intention and constantly or at least very often being in such a state" (AK, e: arc. 14a). The divine qualities inherent in absolute being are considered by Aḥmad al-Qrimi not as:

… accessible meanings of the divine, but as dimensions of the same reality, the comprehension of which can be realised only in its entirety. So, the seeker should not be brought to constant the influence of the separation of the one, as well as to the fact that some inalienable property outweighs the others. (AK, e: ark. 14a)

By Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī, as Chittick points out, the ultimate goal of this path was the maqam la maqam ("place without place"), an imaginary point of reference that did not predict incarnations and signified the reality of the divine essence. At all lower levels, the seeker may be tempted either by the dominance of one of the properties or by the plurality as such, which, according to mystics, is defined in the *Qur'ān* by the concept of "idolatry" (shirk) (Chittick, 1982, p. 110). Shirk is, after all, the acceptance of the individual as universal, the particle as a whole, and the "branches" as the "root": 14a]. The more manifestations the "seeker" comprehends, realising under the influence of which of them are his "bodily forces" ("deeds ... religious precepts ... knowledge"), the faster he approaches the

ultimate truth, which will bring liberation from individuations and will allow you to "feel the presence of the secret." The task of man, described by Aḫmad al-Qrimi in both philosophical and religious terms, is to feel, through an understanding of the external world as "manifested" by absolute being, his own "need" in the divine reality hidden in the "divine properties." "Correlation" as a harmony of macrocosm and microcosm, "external" and "internal", is expressed in the analogy of the very fact of existence, unique in itself and manifested in concrete things. Thus, the task of the "seeker" is to feel like a microcosm, a "list" of the macrocosm, the multiplicity of "derivatives" of which is realised through the manifestations of reality - the "basis". It is this person who will become "perfect" (insān kāmil), will reach the ideal grounded in the writings of the "great shaykh" Ibn Al-'Arabī. Aḫmad al-Qrimi found confirmation of this path of knowledge in the works of Sa'd ad-Dīn At-Taftazānī (1322-1390), who emphasised that the path to knowledge of monotheism should be considered not rational arguments, but the very essences (AK, e: arch. 23b).

Summing up the presentation of the religious and philosophical views of Aḫmad al-Qrimi, we can conclude that most of his works (as he was the author of the postclassical period, whose activities were related to education, in particular - teaching in madrassas) belong to the category of comments. Although these comments often set out original ideas, it is still impossible to understand them without annotated originals and, accordingly, without an assessment of the audience to whom they were addressed. "A Guide for the Lost and a Key for the Demanding," despite its original mission, also echoes the many works of Ibn Al-'Arabī and Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī. It should be noted, however, that the first parts of the work (ontology and epistemology) contain virtually no borrowings and reveal the original logic of the author. Some judgments were reflected in other works by Aḫmad al-Qrimi, in particular, in the gloss "Correction shine in the disclosure of the Light of Exile." Given Aḫmad al-Qrimi's awareness of both Kalām and Sufism, his attempt to bring the positions of both schools closer seems quite predictable. Based on the traditions of Central Asia and the Persian Kalām, and the legacy of ibn Sina played an important role, Aḫmad al-Qrimi tried to justify the ontology and epistemology of Sufism within the concepts used mainly in the Kalām. He,

unlike many Sufi authors, did not reduce the differences between Sufis and mutakallim to the opposition of the "inner" (bāṭin), known to the former, and the "external", to which the latter seem to be limited. In fact, the differences are due to the fact that some mutakallim overestimate the experience of their subjective rationalism and, accordingly, interpret the words of the mystics too literally. Aḥmad al-Qrimi, based mainly on the ontology of Ibn Sina, presents the views of Ibn Al-'Arabī and Ṣadr Ad-Dīn Qūnawī on being in a complete and systematic form. He considers objective individual existence not from the standpoint of radical solipsism, which was criticized by Ibn Al-'Arabī's followers, but from the standpoint of the fundamental division of being into "obligatory" and "possible." The process of knowing the 'True' begins with the objective being, which in the paradigm of mysticism meant "derived" from the divine reality ("primordial"), and in the doctrines of kalām - "sign" (āyat), which "indicates" the existence of the Creator. It is not without reason that Aḥmad al-Krimi draws in his apology for Sufism the work of the mutakallim Sa'd ad-Dīn At-Taftazānī, one of the most authoritative postclassical Avicennaists. Given these features, the Guidelines for the Lost and the Key to the Demanding can be considered perhaps the first work in postclassical Islamic philosophical thought, where Ibn Al-'Arabī's Sufism was seen as a system that could be grasped in the midst of the Maturitic tribe.

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